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Miller: Public Law and the Obselescence of the Lawyer

PUBLIC LAW AND THE OBSOLESCENCE
OF THE LAWYER
ARTHUR SELWYN MILLER*

No one-not even the most brilliant scientist alive todayreally knows where science is taking us. We are aboard a train
which is gatheringspeed, racing down a track on which there
are an unknown number of switches leading to unknown
destinations. No single scientist is in the engine cab and there
may be demons at the switch. Most of society is in the caboose
looking backward.
- LAPP, THE NEW PRIESTHOOD:THE SCIENTIFIC ELITE

AND THE USE OF POWER

29 (1965).

The main lines of our [public] policy, over the long run, are
likely to be determined by scientific developments that we
cannot foresee, rather than by political doctrines that we can
now state.
- PRICE, THE SCIENTIFIC ESTATE 186 (1965).
INTRODUCTION

The eighteen decades sinces the fifty-five men now revered in
America's hagiology sat down in Philadelphia to rewrite the Articles
of Confederation, only to produce a Constitution, have been characterized by one mighty trend: toward increasing intervention of
government into societal affairs. The tendency began early in
American history, even antedating the Philadelphia convention,
mainly in the area of official subventions in favor of business enterprise. The principle of laissez-faire judicially read into the Constitution in the late nineteenth century, was never permitted by its
beneficiaries to prevent government aid; it was government regulation
that was disliked. Or, put another way, it was only when government
undertook to aid other groups in society that the businessman - and
the courts -- found buried in the due process clauses principles sufficient to strike such heresy down. This activity, led by a Supreme
Court which by 1924 could be called the "first authoritative faculty
of political economy in the world's history,"1 reached its peak in the
period from 1890 to 1936. As is well known, the turning point in
the election of 1936 and the "switch in time that saved nine" in
*Professor of Law, The George Washington University.
1. COMMONS, LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF CAPITALISM 7 (1924).
[514)
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1937 found the Court suddenly beginning to uphold regulation of
business and other social legislation. When in 1946 Congress enacted
the Employment Act, the "Positive State" came into full being. 2 In
this brief paper I should like to examine some of the implications
for the legal profession of the rise of the Positive State and of the
proliferation of government. What follows is more suggestive than
exhaustive. Its main theme is that the social milieu in which the
legal profession exists has been so altered - doubtless for multiple
reasons, but of which the scientific-technological revolution is perhaps
of greatest importance - that lawyers must adapt themselves to
changing reality or stand in danger of becoming obsolescent.
Possibly it seems strange to state such a thesis in a legal periodical
which is published in a nation long noted for being the most legalistic
of all. As far back as Alexis de Tocqueville's penetrating commentary, the central position of lawyers as an elite structure in American
society has been a truism. (In one of his roguish moods, Jerome
Frank once opined that a "government of laws and not of men" really
meant a "government of lawyers and not of men.") It may appear
doubly strange for that thesis to be written in the District of Columbia, a colonial enclave in the body politic many of whose inhabitants
are lawyers (or at least have law degrees). Nevertheless, the hypothesis is tentatively advanced that the legal profession as a whole has
not kept pace with a rapidly altering society and, hence, must learn
new skills and new ways of thinking or stand in danger of being
bypassed. The American people will not long tolerate any institution
or any profession which does not fulfill its deepest aspirations and
desires.3 It is by no means clear that Americans today are receiving
what they should from lawyers. To the extent that they are not, a
real tragedy and possible danger exists, for law is too importantmuch too important -not to be seen as central in a nation such as
the United States. 4 But the law that is studied in the law schools and
much of what appears in the writings of lawyers bears little relevance
to the "real" world.
2. The concept of the Positive State has been suggested in previous papers,
including Miller, Constitutional Revolution Consolidated: The Rise of the Positive State, 35 GEO. WAsH. L. Rnv. 173 (1966); Miller, An Affirmative Thrust to Due
Process of Law?, 30 GEo. WASH. L. R1v. 399 (1962); Miller, Foreword: The Public
Interest Undefined, 10 J. PuB. L. 184 (1961).
3. Compare a remark of Frank N. Ikard: "Unless the business community does
take on these new responsibilities, government will step in to an even greater

degree. One way or another, society's needs are going to be met, if not by private
enterprise then by government enterprise," Ikard, Where Business and Government Meet, Petroleum Today, vol. 7, No. 4, 1966, p. 24, 26.

4. For that matter, law is too important to be left to the lawyers. This may
be stated more broadly: no one guild or social group should have a monopoly
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In what follows I should like to amplify upon these statements,
indicating some of the impacts of the Positive State and of public
law. No attempt will be made to trace the causes of rapid social
change, but certain assumptions will be made; they include the following: (a) change is a constant in the social order and will continue
for the indeterminate future, both as to the rate and the amount
of change; 5 (b) American government will continue to assume the
affirmative duties subsumed under the rubric of the Positive State;e
(c) population will continue to grow, here and throughout the world,
at a rapid rate;7 (d) urbanization of the populace will continue in
the United States; 8 (e) the United States will continue to be deeply
immersed in world affairs and will literally know no frontiers in
its interests; 9 (f) conflict will continue to be the norm in world
affairs, but thermonuclear warfare will not take place; 10 (g) the
United States will be torn with internal strife arising out of the
demand of Negro Americans for better status and of other disadvantaged Americans for higher standards of economic well-being; 1'
(h) government and business will continue to move perceptibly
closer together so that political and economic power will tend to be
merged;' 2 and (i) steps, however halting, will be taken toward multi13
national integration of the nations along the North Atlantic littoral.
Each of these propositions probably should be thoroughly documented; the references given are merely to some papers and books touching upon specific matters. The factor to be emphasized in that listing
is the first, for it cannot be repeated too often that this is indeed an
age of rapid, even cataclysmic social change. Perhaps, as has been
over any matter of real social importance.
5. See Miller, Technology, Social Change, and the Constitution, 33 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 17 (1964).
6. See articles cited in note 2 supra.
7. See Miller, Some Observations on the Political Economy of Population
Growth, 25 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 614 (1960).
8. See GOTrMAN, MEGALOPOLIS (1961).

9. Compare

CLEVELAND,

THE OBLIGATIONS

OF

POWER

(1966) with

STILLMAN

PFAFF, POWER AND IMPOTENCE: TIlE FAILURE OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY

&

(1966).

10. On conflict being the norm, compare LORENZ, ON AGGRESSION (1966) with
THE TERRITORIAL IMPERATIVE (1966). See also Joseph Alsop, The Way
of an Aggressor, The New Yorker, Sept. 10, 1966, p. 209 (a lengthy review of
ARDREY,

LORENZ, op. cit. supra).
11. See BENNETT, CONFRONTATION: BLACK AND WHITE (1965); Miller, Mulkey v.

Reitman: A Brave but Futile Gesture?, 14 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 51 (1966).
12. See the discussion in Miller, Constitutional Revolution Consolidated: The
Rise of the Positive State, 35 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 172 (1966). See also PIcE, THE
SCIENTIFIC ESTATE (1965).
13. See Miller, The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development,
17 YEARBOOK OF WORLD AFFAIRS 80 (1963).
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suggested above, science and technology are the principal causes of
that change.' 4 But whatever the reason, the fact of change as a constant in a social order which draws its philosophical premises from
Newtonian cosmology and Cartesian philosophy poses new and critical problems to all Americans, not least the legal profession.
THE IMPACT OF PUBLIC LAW

A treatise could be written - should be written - on the meaning
of public law in the modem era. Obviously, all that can be done
in this brief paper is to single out a few of the principal characteristics of the Positive State so far as law is concerned.
What, first, is the Positive State? It is a shorthand designation
for the express acceptance during the past several decades (since,
say, 1933) of an affirmative responsibility on the part of government
to enhance the economic well-being of all Americans. Embodied in
a series of legislative and executive pronouncements, it received its
charter in the Employment Act of 1946, an enactment which, although in form a statute, is of such fundamental importance that
it can and should be thought of as a constitutional amendment. 15
Its significance even now far transcends all but a few of the actual
amendments; and in the long run it may well overshadow even that
compendium of the essence of American constitutionalism, the Fourteenth Amendment. I do not propose to argue the merits of this
new posture of government, but rather to indicate some of its impact
upon the legal profession.' 6
Law in the United States during the nineteenth century was
largely the received corpus of principle known as the common law
of England. Not that the reception was easy or without incident;
as Perry Miller's prize-winning study indicates, the road during the
early nineteenth century was rough indeed.'. But Blackstone triumphed, both in doctrine and in his conception of the nature of the
judicial process. What have been the consequences? Several, no
doubt. One may be singled out for attention here: The paradox
that law was for the most part judge-made - rightly so, in the judgment of many -although judges were denied, in the Blackstonian
theory, any creativity. Law, consequently, has proceeded in this
14. Compare

LAPP, THE NEw

PRIESTHOOD: TBE SCIENTIFIC ELrrE AND

THE

USE OF POwER (1965), with PRIcE, op. cit. supra note 12.
15. See Rosrow, PLANNING FOR FREEm: THE PUBLIC LAW OF AMERICAN
CAPITALISM (1959).

16. Previous discussion may be found in Miller, The Impact of Public Law
on Legal Education, 12 J. LErAL ED. 483 (1960).
17. P. MILLER, THE LIFE OF THE MIND INAMERIcA Book II (1965).
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country by "denying change." 18 That conflict between actuality and
theory has occupied American legal writers for decades, although
recently the Blackstone theory of the judicial function has been so
repudiated that it is to whip a dead horse to belabor any more the
point that judges have a creative role. (I speak here of the appellate
judge, the main source of written opinions, and thus the creator of
law; but the trial judge is not immune from the tenor of the remarks.) This does not mean that many lawyers-even judges-do
not adhere, at least outwardly, to the tenets of Blackstonianism, as
witness the comment of Judith Shklar: 19
From Austin to Gray . . .writers on jurisprudence have urged
judges to face the facts of life candidly, to accept the responsibilities the community has placed upon their shoulders, and
to make rules that seem to them useful and intelligent. To
the judge, however, these are frightful occasions. By training
and professional ideology he is tied to a vision of his function
that excludes self-assertion and places a premium on following
existing rules impartially. His natural impulse is to find a
rule at any cost, or at least to assimilate his decision to a rule
as closely as possible. He may even openly evade responsibility. Most likely, there will be a plaintive call for some rule,
any rule, even if statute and precedent have failed, from society or from the specialists and experts in the field of social
life into which the awkward case falls. Either he will convince
himself that some set of social facts, some set of expertly developed "is" conditions, yields a rule for him automatically,
or he will appeal to a high law, or he will rely on what he
hopes is the view of the majority of his fellow citizens.
Prisoners of a philosophy anchored in the precisely calculated mechanics of Isaac Newton, judges of this ilk - and there still are
many -look upon law as a closed, logically consistent body of principles and view their task as finding the one applicable principle
or analogy to apply to the case at hand. Put another way, this means
that the received wisdom under which the legal profession today
labors is based upon a cosmology that has been exploded by Einstein,
and a philosophy which has not yet assimilated the insights of the
Darwinian revolution or the teachings of Freud. Even the Copernican revolution, which shattered the Ptolemaic universe that had
earth and man at its center, is still not fully accepted by legal philosophers: The lag is great indeed between scientific and legal thought.

18.
19.

DIESING, REASON IN SOCIETY 154 (1962).
SHKLAR, LEGALISM 101 (1964).
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This says little of other scientific discoveries and insights which
have in recent decades contributed so much to social change and to
the alteration of views of man's place in the scheme of things. For
example, apparently no lawyer or legal scholar has yet attempted
to master the new discipline of ethnology and to think about it and
its implications for law and lawyers and the American people.20 The
"new biology" as well as other disciplines have been radically changing in recent years. But lawyers have been doing little indeed. The
legal profession, still struggling under the constrictions of Blackstonianism, has no institutionalized means of dealing with change. It
has not, to repeat, yet even reconciled the fact of law as existing rule
with the fact of change - and that in a time of the most rapid social
(and legal) change in history. What is needed, in briefest terms, is
to perceive of law as a flow of decisions, rather than as a static and
closed system: an ever-changing institution which is always in a state
of "becoming."
But this does not solve the great antinomies of which Cardozo
21
spoke: rest and motion, static and dynamic, stability and progress.
Rather, it merely adds another dimension to the problem; for if it is
true, as Roscoe Pound put it, that the law must be stable, "yet it
cannot stand still,"22 it is necessary for legal scholars and for the profession generally to come to grips with the paradox that stability and
change presents. 2 3 I do not propose to do more here than to suggest
some of the questions which occur in thinking about this crucial
problem. These may be suggested in the form of a chart, listing in
one column some aspects of the "new reality" and in the second the
meaning of this for the profession. Following the listing, which places
seven items of "challenge" contrapuntally with "response," a brief
discussion of each item will be made:

20. See, e.g.,

LoREeaz, ON AGGRESSION

(1966). International lawyers might well

ponder its implications.

21. CAQwozo, PARAnoxEs oF LEGAL. SciEcE 5-7 (1928).
22. PouND, INTERPRETATIONS OF LEGAL HISTORY 1 (1922).
23. On the need for denying change, see Mishkin, The High Court, the Great
Writ, and the Due Process of Law and Time, 79 HAv.L. REv. 56, 62-70 (1965).
See generally Auerbach, Law and Social Change in the United States, 6 U.C.L.A.L.

REv. 516 (1959).
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The Positive State
Challenge
1. Immense growth of public
law
2. Politicization of law and
the legal processes

3. New techniques in the public administration
4. Change in the legal practice,
within and without government
5. Courts are no longer central
to the legal system
6. Courts require reorganization to perform their duties
7. New social problems obtruding

Response
Need to view law as "process," not
a static system
Requirement of "forward looking"; need to mesh law as normation with law as instrument of
policy
Lawyers must attain new skills
Need for more information by
lawyers
Need to learn to deal with the
"administrative state"
Need for new institutional devices
to aid judges
Lawyers must adapt themselves to
grappling with them

The suggestion is not that this listing of the "challenges" of the
Positive State is in any way exhaustive; those items which are mentioned are merely some of the more obvious. Neither is it suggested
that the "response" of the legal profession has been total or even
adequate to the need. In fact, a conclusion which will be reached
below is quite to the contrary: that lawyers have not, in any aspect
of the profession, met sufficiently the pressing problems of the day.
A second conclusion is that the American people should receive more
from the profession. The probability is that the lawyer, for a number
of reasons, will continue to be supplanted by practitioners of other
disciplines - economists and scientists and engineers, among others as this nation becomes, in fact, the "technological state."
A few paragraphs must suffice for present purposes to serve as
discussion for each of the listed points.
1. Growth of public law. The growth of government in size and
importance has meant that public law is becoming the dominant
segment of the legal order. But the received wisdom under which
lawyers (and legal educators) labor is largely private-law oriented.
During the early part of the nineteenth century, when courts were
still central to the law-making process, one could validly say that
the main thrust of law was "private" and not "public." The legal
system at that time was the analogue of the economic system of
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laissez-faire - to the extent that that economic order existed - and
save for occasional constitutional cases (very few in number), public
law was only peripheral to the legal order. A change took place in
the post-Civil War period, exemplified in the Granger and Populist
movements and the growth of legislation as the center of law-making;
the beginnings of what later became a flood of public law pronouncements may be seen in such landmark enactments as the Interstate
Commerce Commission statute of 1887 and the Sherman Antitrust
Act of 1890. The flood crested in the 1930's and '40's with the many
programs of the Positive State, and has since continued at a high
stage in the period since the Second World War. Public law, however
defined, has in that time become dominant - not only in the new
substantive areas carved out by legal educators and law publishers
but also in the fact that it is having a pervasive impact upon the
traditional private-law categories. Thus one sees, in the first place,
many new legal pigeonholes: taxation and labor law, administrative
law and securities regulation, government contracts and international
law, to name but a few. Secondly, such traditional categories as contracts and torts and property are being substantially altered by the
influence of public-law concepts.
A challenge posed by the new system is to see law both normatively (as an ordering system, its historical characteristic) and instrumentally, as the means by which public policies come into being and are
administered, and thus as the official means by which values are translated into governmental policies. This, then, calls for a new type of
thinking, for if law is no longer perceived as a static system of
logically consistent principles and attention must be paid to the ends
and purposes of law, lawyers can no longer only fly backwards to see
where they have been; they must also learn to "fly forwards" - to
think purposively, in terms of aims and goals and of alternative
methods of achieving them.24 As yet, this need has not been translated into legal education, however much it may be a fact in the
practice. Beyond doubt, it is a fact for those lawyers who advise
governmental officials; 25 and it is likely true for those whose practice
26
takes them into contact with the public administration.

24. See Mayo & Jones, Legal-Policy Decision Process: Alternative Thinking and
the Predictive Function, 33 GEo. WASH. L. Rav. 318 (1964).
25. For examples, see Chayes, Law and the Quarantine of Cuba, 41 FOREIGN
ArFams 550 (1963); Meeker, Defense Quarantine and the Law, 57 Am.J. INT'L L.
515 (1963). An instructive insight may be gleaned from Mr. Justice Jackson's
statement in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 634 (1951)
(concurring opinion) that he was not bound as a judge by what he might have
said as the President's lawyer, that is, the Attorney General.
26. See HORsKY, THE WASHINGTON LAWYER (1952).
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But legal educators, if one takes as evidence the books published
for law school use (whether casebooks or textbooks), have with few
exceptions not yet caught up with the need. They are still excessively
court-oriented and they still issue books and articles which can only
be based on a premise that the public-law explosion never took place.
Most writing in legal periodicals, for that matter, falls into the same
category, whether it deals with a private- or public-law subject. Legal
writers tend by and large to make their publications exercises in
doctrinal exegesis upon appellate court texts, without reference to
the context in which the legal problem arose or the social and other
factors which might be relevant. When they do mention "policy"
considerations, it is done in such a way as if "policy" were an alien
intruder in the judicial process and without serious discussion of the
many difficult facets of any policy question. 27 But, as Myres S. McDougal has said, 28 reference to technical legal considerations alone
cannot resolve many of the human problems with which lawyers deal.
Of perhaps even more basic importance is the need, long noted
by nonlawyers, to think in terms of "process" and not of a "static
system." 29 The static philosophy of an unchanging universe, mancentered and earth-centered, is Ptolemaic; beyond Copernicus and
Newton is the philosophy of process, of change. The requirement is
for seeing law as process, rather than as a fixed body of rules, a
requirement which involves opening the mind to a greater variety
of information. Viewing law as process, open-ended and everchanging, is fundamentally different from the familiar learning of
the immediate past. 30

However, the concept of "system" cannot and

should not be abandoned: the need is for a marriage of process and
system. If, as will be discussed in Number 3, below, new techniques
in public administration and management involve "systems analysis,"
jurisprudents (and practicing lawyers) must broaden their horizons
to encompass the entire social system. 3 1 Law is not autonomous, but
27. There is no systematic and comprehensive discussion of "policy" in the
literature; the term is often used but seldom defined-and when defined, it is
in terms of high-level abstractions which tell one little. See, e.g., PATTErSON,
JURISPRUDENCE: MEN AND IDEAS IN THE LAW
(1953). Professor Walter Probert of
the University of Florida has done more than anyone to suggest the need for
bringing the insights of semantics and syntactics to bear upon analysis and explication of the legal process. See, e.g., Probert, Law and Persuasion: The Language Behavior of Lawyers, 108 U. PA. L. REV. 35 (1959).
28. McDougal, International Law, Power and Policy: A Contemporary Conception 82 HAGUE REcUEIL 137 (1953). Professor McDougal was speaking of in-

ternational legal problems, but his point seems to be generally valid.
29. Cf. WHITEHEAD, PROCEss AND REALITY (1929).
30. Cf. McDougal, Law as a Process of Decision, 1 NATURAL L.F. 53 (1956).
31. See Gross, Preface to A Historical Note on Social Indicators, in SOCIAL
INDICATORS ix, xviii (Bauer ed. 1966).
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inextricably linked with the other elements in what Kenneth E.
Boulding calls a "total social system." 3 2 Writing in 1913, Woodrow
Wilson maintained: "Living political constitutions must be Darwinian in structure and practice. Society is a living organism and must
' 33
obey the laws of life, not of [Newtonian] mechanics; it must develop."
The point sought to be made here is that law, as a part of society,
is a "living organism" which must obey the laws of life and not of
mechanics. 34 To do so will require thinking in terms of goals and
purposes and of results - in short, of "process."
Whether it is liked or not, it seems to be accurate to say that
judges, if one may take for purposes of example only the United
States Supreme Court, have long seen and acted upon the need for
thinking in terms of something more than "principle" or "rule."
However the Justices may write their opinions, it seems clear beyond
peradventure that at no time in American constitutional history have
they not been "result oriented."3 5 Accordingly, it may be said that,
in part at least, there has been at least a tacit recognition on the
part of the bench that law should be viewed as process and not as
a static system. In making this statment about how the Supreme
Court has to some extent always been "result oriented," I realize that
the view runs counter to that held by a group of modem legal
scholars elsewhere labelled as "counterrevolutionaries" (to the movement known as "legal realism") .36 But until an exponent of that
school of thought can name one period in the Court's history when
it acted otherwise, the point seems valid.
2. Politicizationof law. If one accepts the proposition that public
law is all pervasive, then the next thing to be seen is that it represents,
in the manner in which it has developed, a system of politicized law.
Law as "normation," to use Karl Llewellyn's term, is being replaced
within the ambit of public law by its becoming a part of the political
process. Obviously, this characteristic overlaps with the first, discussed
above; in some respects, it may be another way of saying that law
has to be viewed instrumentally as well as conceptually or doctrinally.
Many examples could be given to illustrate the point; two must
suffice for present purposes: (a) the fact that "administration is
politics," often on the grand scale, and (b) the manner in which
32. Boulding, The Ethics of Rational Decision, 12 MANAGEMENT SCIENCE 161
(1966).
33. WILSON, TnE NEW FREEDOM 48 (1913).

34.

Cf. SINNOTr, MATTER,MIND AND MAN (1958).

35. Cf. Miller, On the Need for "Impact Analysis" of Supreme Court Decisions,
53 GEo. L. J. 365 (1965).
36. Discussed in Miller, PresidentialPower To Impound Appropriated Funds:
An Exercise in Constitutional Decision-Making, 43 N.C.L. REv. 501 (1965).
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the award of federal contracts and grants has become enmeshed in
politics.
The fact that administration is politics may be seen with particular clarity within the so-called independent regulatory commissions-those peculiarly American organizations which may be commissions, whatever that word means, but which in fact are not "independent" and do little "regulation." 37 They tend, to some indeterminate and doubtless differing extent, to be in a symbiotic relationship
with those who are purportedly regulated. In all probability, the
close coincidence of interest of regulator and regulated began early
in the history of the commissions, as the famous statement of Richard
Olney, President Cleveland's Attorney General, evidences: Said he,
in reply to a friend who had recommended abolition of the Interstate
Commerce Commission, "My impression would be that looking at
the matter from a railroad point of view exclusively it would not be
a wise thing to undertake.... The Commission, as its functions have
now been limited by the courts, is, or can be made, of great use to
the railroads. It satisfies the popular clamor for a government supervision of railroads, at the same time that the supervision is almost
entirely nominal. Further, the older such a commission gets to be,
the more inclined it will be found to take the business and railroad
view of things. . . . The part of wisdom is not to destroy the Commission, but to utilize it." 8 During the 1930's, when the Positive

State came into full bloom, much attention was paid to the idea of
"government by expert," by which apparently it was meant that the
problems of administration could be referred to agencies manned
by experts who would make "objective" decisions in the "public
interest." A more naive conception of government, in this or any
other country, would be hard to locate. What has happened is what
Judge Henry J. Friendly discusses in his Holmes Lectures published
in 1962: by delegating power to the commissions and agencies, Congress merely transferred the political battlegrounds westerly down
Washington's Pennsylvania Avenue.3 9
The consequence is that by and large we have, in the words of
Charles A. Horsky, "emphatically a government of men, not of
'
laws. "40
Judge Friendly bemoaned the failure of administrators "to
develop standards sufficiently definite to permit decisions to be fairly

37.

See

38. As
(1965).
39.

BERNSTEIN,

REGULATING

BUSINESS

BY

INDEPENDENT

CONIMISSION

quoted in JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION

FRIENDLY,

TiiE FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE

(1955).
12 n.6

AGENCIES: TInE NEED FOR BETTER

(1962).
40. HORSKY, op. cit. supra note 26, at 68.

DEFINITION OF STANDARDS
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predictable and the reasons for them understood."41 The consequence of this failure is that public policy, however enunciated (by
rule or decision or order, tends to be the resultant of a parallelogram
of conflicting political forces. 42 As Professor Marver Bernstein has
43
put it:
The fraternity of political scientists and public administration
experts has increasingly accepted the finding that regulation
is a political process. "Politics" is now rightly viewed not only
as unavoidable, but as essential to the formulation of policies
that bear some rational relation to economic and technological conditions. As one scholarly study concludes: "The
mentality which disdains 'politics' and strives for a neutral and
technical perfection rejects the very solvents that would
reduce the obstructions."
Calling administration or regulation "politics" should not be taken
as a term of opprobrium, for as Bernstein notes, politics is not only
inevitable but essential to the formulation of policies within the
Positive State. 44 The challenge it presents is that the lawyer within
government and the lawyer who must deal with government have
to look upon the nature of their assignments in a different manner
than they would if they were advocates before courts. They must
think of goals or aims to be achieved, rather than in terms of limitations; they must, in short, think about what must be accomplished
if the American system is to endure, rather than what a given person
(official) cannot do. Law erects few limitations in the higher reaches
of the public administration; we have not yet learned to accept this,
but accept it we must if public law is to be assimilated into the legal
system and properly managed.4 5
3. New Management Techniques. When in 1965 the Bureau of
the Budget -that little known but vastly powerful segment of the
Executive Offices of the President -issued Bulletin No. 66-3, what
may in fact be a revolutionary development in the public administration took place. That Bulletin, in short, required of Executive
agencies (and recommended to the independent commissions) that
FRIENDLY, Op. cit. supra note 39.
42. See Fainsod, Some Refltections on the Nature of the Regulatory Process,
41.

in PUBLIC POLICY: THE YEARBOOK OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION OF HARVARD UNIVERSITY 297, 298 (1940).
43. Bernstein, The Regulatory Process: A Framework for Analysis, 26 LAW &
CONTEMPI. PROB. 329, 340-41 (1961).

44.
45.

Cf. Rosrow, op. cit. supra note 15.
Cf. FRIEDMANN, LAW IN A CHANGING SocIry (1959).
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they clearly define their major objectives (that is, "programs") which
they desire to pursue, that they apply "systems analysis" to alternative
ways in which these goals are being or may be achieved, and that
they plan their expenditures in long-range as well as one-year (annual
appropriation) terms. 46 This is the Planning-Programming-Budgeting
System, already known in the alphabetese of Washington as PPBS,
and already the subject of agonizing appraisals and reappraisals within the amorphous confines of the public administration. It does not
sound very revolutionary; rather, it merely seems to be the application of common sense to the governmental process. Oddly, but perhaps not surprisingly, it may be both.
What in essence PPBS calls for is a more "rational" approach
to the decision-making process within government. It is the extension
throughout government of "program budgeting" which was introduced into the Department of Defense in 1961 by Secretary of
Defense Robert McNamara. Its genesis may be traced to studies
made by the RAND Corporation in the early 1950's. When the
Kennedy administration came into power in 1961, the new Secretary
of Defense appointed to strategic positions within the DOD officials,
such as Charles J. Hitch and Alain C. Enthoven, who had been affiliated with RAND for several years. 47 Without attempting to define
"rationality" in this process, PPBS ultimately means that it is more
advisable to know what one is doing than to act on the basis of
intuitive feelings -a modest claim, no doubt, but nonetheless revolutionary in its impact. "What the new intellectual techniques, such
as those used in PPBS, attempt to provide are methods by which
those who make the decisions about how the government should
direct its efforts can increase their awareness of the conditions and
consequences of their choices and can clarify the elements that,
48
explicitly or implicitly, enter into their judgments."
This is not the place to discuss all of the facets of PPBS and
other new managerial techniques, for example, the concept of "social
indicators." 49 The suggestion is made that here, as in the first two
"challenges," the "response" of the legal profession has thus far been
woefully inadequate. If lawyers are to deal effectively within government - as generalists, as officials, and even as legal advisers - they
must learn new skills and new ways of thinking. And if lawyers are
to deal effectively with government as private practitioners, they
had better know how government operates and how decisions are
made in the public administration. The reference here is not merely
46.
47.
48.

49.

See PROGRAM BUDGETING (Novick ed. 1965).

See HITCH, DECISION-MAKING FOR DEFENSE (1965).
Held, PPBS Comes to Washington, 1 THE PUBLIC
Discussed in SOCIAL INDICATORS (Bauer ed. 1966).
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to the decisions of the independent regulatory commissions, but to
the entire flow of administrative decisions- from the congeries of
agencies, bureaus, departments, and commissions in the obviously
public administration to the welter of "private" organizations which
in fact exercise administrative responsibilities.50 Lawyers have not
yet met the challenge of the new public administration in anything
more than sporadic fashion. Legal educators, particularly in that odd
bag of windy abstractions called "administrative law," simply are
neither cognizant of nor are they keeping abreast of new developments. The result is that the legal profession each year adds a new
crop of neophytes who have little or no appreciation for the requirements of dealing with the new public administration- with, that is,
51
the "administrative state."
Within government, lawyers, long the American elite from which
generalists were chosen, are giving way to economists and to others
who are privy to the new techniques and new knowledge. Lawyers
are, as a consequence, losing caste; the skills and techniques and
knowledge they bring from law school and even from some parts
of legal practice do not give them the type of training needed to
operate in the scientific-technological age. They are still taught to
look backwards, to see where they have been, in order to suggest
what should be done in the future, when the very nature of the
situation, the very fact that a problem exists, 5 2 means that the solutions and answers of yesteryear are faulty. They have not been exposed to the need for purposive, forward thinking-in terms of
goals and effects and of alternative means of achieving goals. I am
not suggesting that the proponents of PPBS have all or even most
of the answers, or even that it is wholly desirable that the system
be introduced into government. But I am suggesting that it is part
of the wave of the future and that lawyers had better be cognizant
53
of it.
4. Other Effects. The other challenges of the Positive State may,
50. See the Symposium Administration by Contract: An Examination of Governmental Contracting-Out,31 GEo. WAsH L. REv. 685 (1963).

51. I have been told by a highly-placed official in the Department of Justice
and also by a lawyer in the Bureau of the Budget that the newcomers to government service under the Department of Justice's annual "honors program" are
poorly prepared for the tasks they are asked to do when they arrive. Lawyers in
leading law firms echo the same complaint with respect to the abilities of

neophytes in the private practice.
52. The concept of "problem" is discussed in Mayo &Jones, supra note 24, at
325.
53. PROGRAM BUDGETING (Novick ed. 1965) is the best introduction, although
it is rather uncritical.
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with one exception, be summarily treated. There can be little doubt
that legal practice is changing (which requires, among other things,
new information by lawyers); that courts are no longer central to
54
the legal system (this requires a reorientation of legal education,
as well as an ability to deal effectively with new centers of decisionmaking) ;55 and that courts, to the extent that they operate, are in
need of reorganization in order to perform better their important
duties in an age of public law (in other words, new institutional
means of aiding judges should be developed) .5 Each of these could
be expanded and dealt with at greater length, but time and space
57
do not permit such a treatment.
The seventh in the listing of challenges brought by the Positive
State relates to the new type of social problems presented by industrialization, urbanization, the population explosion, new weapons of war,
new methods of communication, and the drive toward equality both
within the U.S.A. and throughout the world.58 In all of these, and
more, whether they are of a lesser degree of abstraction such as automation or slum clearance or population control or control of nuclear
proliferation or whatever, lawyers are not prominent among those
who respond. At times law-trained officials do take part in the problems presented by the new technology, but that, it would seem, is
less because they are lawyers than because they otherwise have the
type of mind and personality equipped to deal with emergent problems. Within the collectivized bar, the same lack may be seen: for
example, the American Law Institute still largely concerns itself
with "restating" the law - probably the largest single exercise in
intellectual futility the legal profession has engaged in during
American history. The American Bar Association, with one or two
instances to the contrary, simply does not seem able to meet and
grapple with the real problems of real people. Perhaps this is because
the A.B.A. exemplifies Michels' "iron law of oligarchy," and thus
apparently is dominated by lawyers who represent corporate clients.
It is a pillar of orthodoxy in a rapidly changing world.

54. See Levi, Law Schools and the Universities, 17 J. LEGAL ED. 243 (1965).
55.
56.

Mainly in the public administration, broadly defined.
For a discussion of one need, see Massel, Economic Analysis in Judicial
Antitrust Decisions, 20 REPORTS OF SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW OF THE AMERICAN
BAR AsSOCIATION 46 (1962).

57. One perceives little evidence of any thoroughgoing re-examination of law,
the legal process, or legal education, in the light of an altered social milieu. Such
changes as do come are likely to be "incremental" rather than "revolutionary."
Cf. LINDBLOM & BRAYBROOKE, THE STRATEGY OF DECISION

58. See WARD,
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SOME CONCLUSIONS

A conclusion one draws from such a discussion may be simply
stated: the lawyer is becoming "de-professionalized" and more and
more is a limited technician, a legal mechanic. Necessary he may be,
just as auto mechanics are necessary, but hardly of the order of the
engineer who builds the auto. The bar is de-professionalized, both
within and without government: within government, because the
lawyer seems to be the mere handmaiden of the policy-maker; without government, because he is at the call of the highest bidder for
his services.
A second, and perhaps more important conclusion, is that the
lawyer - whether professional or mere technician - may well plummet in social importance unless he adapts himself to changing reality
and to the demands and deepest aspirations of the American people.
There is little evidence that such an adaptation is taking place. While
this does not mean that lawyers will disappear or even become obsolete, it does mean that they may well become less relevant to the
world at large and thus obsolescent. No doubt they will still be
around, perhaps in large numbers, but merely as practitioners "in a
rather esoteric craft of limited social value." 59 Many years ago the
prescient Holmes could call the lawyer of the future, not the blackletter man, but the expert in economics and statistics. The Holmesian
future is here, but the black-letter men still predominate. In an age
when public law is all pervasive, they still are private-law oriented;
in the era of the "administrative state," they still think courts are
central; in a Darwinian and Einsteinian age, they still adhere to
Ptolemy and Newton; in a time when Freud and successors have
revolutionized the conception of the human mind, they still cling
tightly to the ideas of the Age of the Enlightenment. Law may be
"conservative" - it is of necessity a conserving influence - but there
is no requirement that it be blind.

59.

RosrOW,
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